APPENDIX

A1. For Online Publication: Technical Appendix

A1.1 Match Process

We matched the clerkship identity data to political donations in the Database on Ideology, Money, and Elections (DIME) by way of a two-step matching process. First, because the identifying information reported in the clerkship data was limited to name, law school attended, and year of graduation, we initially matched the clerkship data to the Martindale-Hubbell directory, a comprehensive database of attorneys in the United States today. Given the much smaller population of lawyers as compared to donors, a small amount of information (name, law school, and year of law degree) was sufficient to uniquely match most clerks against records in the Martindale-Hubbell directory.

Next, we matched the individuals matched to the Martindale-Hubbell directory to DIME, based on first, last, and middle name; suffix; title; address; and firm or employer. To adjust for variations across records, we used the Jaro-Winkler algorithm, which measures the distance between two strings (in this case, names); the lesser the distance, the more alike two strings are.

A1.2 Imputation of Missing Ideology Data

Using a nonparametric missing value imputation process based on a random forest model, we impute missing CFscores for clerks. Specifically, we use the `missForest` `R` package developed by Stekhoven and Buhlmann (2012). This package imputes missing values in an iterative fashion using a non-parametric machine-learning approach. The approach accounts for nonlinearities, interactions between variables, and variables that are only partially observed. The package assesses the accuracy of the imputed values based on the out-of-bag error between observed and imputed values.

To estimate the missing CFscores for clerks with this model, we use data on a number of attributes of the clerks, including: (1) gender, (2) law school attended, (3) state in which lower court judges which employed the clerk is located, (4) the lower judge's own estimated CFscore, (5) the identity of the president who appointed the lower court hiring judge, (6) attributes of the clerk later in life (e.g., employment type, current state of residence). This model imputes clerk CFscores with reasonable accuracy: the out-of-bag mean square error is 0.29 and a Pearson correlation of 0.64.

A1.3 Derivation of Adjustment for Missing Ideology Data

Let μ denote the fraction of the clerks with missing ideology scores. Suppose the mean ideology of the unobserved clerks in a justice-term is equal to ρ times the mean ideology of the observed clerks in that justice-term,

$$c_{jt}^{U} = \rho\, c_{jt} \tag{1}$$

where $\rho < 1$ corresponds to the case in which clerks with more intense ideological preferences are more likely to donate.

True clerk ideology in a justice-term is given by $c_{jt}^{*} = (1-\mu)c_{jt} + \mu c_{jt}^{U}$, i.e., the weighted average of the observed and unobserved clerks. Using (1), we can re-write this to obtain:

$$c_{jt} = \frac{c_{jt}^{*}}{1-\mu+\rho\mu} \tag{2}$$

Judicial voting in a justice-term is a function of the true clerk ideology in a justice-term, $y_{jt} = \beta c_{jt}^{*} + \varepsilon_{jt}$, or, using (2):

$$y_{jt} = \beta(1-\mu+\rho\mu)\, c_{jt} + \varepsilon_{jt} \tag{3}$$

Consequently, regressing voting behavior (y_{jt}) on observed clerk ideology (c_{jt}) yields an estimated coefficient of $\hat{\beta} = \beta(1-\mu+\rho\mu)$. The true effect of clerk influence on judicial voting can thus be obtained by scaling the estimated coefficient:

$$\beta = \frac{\hat{\beta}}{1-\mu+\rho\mu}$$

In our data, $\mu = 0.278$ and $\hat{\beta} = 0.010$ in our preferred specification, implying a true coefficient for clerk

influence given by $\beta = \frac{0.010}{0.722+.278*\rho}$. Thus, depending on the value of ρ (i.e., the degree to which variation in contribution rates are driven by variation in the intensity of clerks' ideological preference), the value of β lies between 0.010 and 0.014.

A2. For Online Publication: Supplementary Appendix

The Supplementary Appendix provides additional information on eight topics. First, Section A2.1 provides information on the rate of missing ideology data in our sample. Figure A1 reports the distribution of the number of missing clerks at the justice-term level. Table A1 provides a breakdown of the number of observed and total clerks at the justice-term level.

Second, Section A2.2 reports more details related to justice voting and their clerks. Table A2 reports the Justice information on the number of terms present in the sample, the number of votes cast, and the percent of votes cast that were conservative. It also reports the number of clerks hired, the proportion of clerks observed, and the mean ideology of the clerks.

Third, Section A2.3 provides more details on the distribution of clerk CFscores within justices. Figure A2 reports the distribution of clerk CFscores by justice. Figure A3 plots the clerk-level CFscores over time along with the mean annual CFscore by justice. Figure A4 provides binned scatterplot of annual justice voting and mean clerk CFscore.

Fourth, Section A2.4 provide alternative results using alternative statistics of annual clerk CFscores. Table A3 reports the main results using the median, minimum, and maximum clerk CFscore as the primary independent variable.

Fifth, Section A2.5 provides details on conservative voting by subgroup. Table A4 reports the mean conservative vote share and the proportion of cases within subgroups used in the analysis in the paper.

Sixth, Section A2.6 provides details of the survey we conducted on the timing of Supreme Court clerk hiring. It also contains the wording of the email we sent to a random sample of clerks. Figure A5 provides the distribution of lag times between when a clerk reported having been hired and when the clerkship began.

Seventh, Section A2.7 tests the stability of clerk ideology over time. Table 8 reports the results of regressions restricting clerk donations to those that occurred within (or before) five years after the clerkship. Table A5 reports the results of regressions estimating the relationship between clerk ideology before clerking and after clerking.

Eighth, Section A2.8 provides alternative results when accounting for clerks for retired justices. Table A6 reports the main results when assigning clerks for retired justices' to the active justices the clerks worked for.

A2.1 Missing Ideology Data

Figure A1 Number of Clerks Unobserved by Justice-Term




Table A1 Number of Law Clerks Matched to Donations Divided by Total Law Clerks by Justice-Term

	Justice																					
Term	Alito	Black	Blackmun	Brennan	Breyer	Burger	Clark	Douglas	Ginsburg	Harlan	Kennedy	Marshall	O'Connor	Powell	Rehnquist	Roberts	Scalia	Souter	Stevens	Stewart	Thomas	Warren	White
1960		1/2		1/2			2/2	1/1		2/2										0/1		2/2	
1961		1/1		2/2			1/2	1/1		2/2										0/1		1/3	1/2
1962		1/2		1/2			2/2	1/1		2/2										0/1		2/3	1/1
1963		1/1		1/2			2/2	1/1		2/2										2/2		2/3	1/2
1964		1/1		0/2			1/1	1/1		2/3										1/1		3/3	1/1
1965		2/2		2/2			2/2	1/1		1/2										2/2		2/3	1/1
1966		1/2		2/2			1/2	1/1		2/2										1/2		0/3	2/2
1967		1/2		2/2				1/2		2/2		2/2								2/2		1/3	2/2
1968		1/1		2/2				0/1		2/2		0/2								2/2		3/3	2/2
1969		1/2		1/2		4/7		1/1		2/3		2/2								2/2			1/2
1970		3/3	2/3	2/3		2/3		2/2		2/3		3/3								3/3			2/3
1971			2/2	3/3		2/5		1/3				2/3								2/3			3/3
1972			3/3	2/3		3/4		2/3				3/3		2/3	3/3					2/3			3/3
1973			1/3	2/3		2/3		2/3				3/3		3/3	1/3					3/3			3/3
1974			2/3	2/3		2/3		3/3				1/3		3/4	2/3					2/3			1/3
1975			2/3	3/3		3/3		2/2				3/3		2/4	1/3				1/1	3/3			2/2
1976			2/3	3/4		3/3						4/4		1/4	2/3				2/5	3/4			2/2
1977			3/4	4/4		3/4						3/4		4/4	2/3				3/3	2/4			3/4
1978			4/4	2/4		2/4						2/4		1/4	3/3				2/2	2/3			3/4
1979			2/4	4/4		2/4						3/4		4/4	3/3				2/2	3/3			3/4
1980			2/4	3/4		4/4						2/4		3/4	3/3				2/2	3/3			3/4
1981			3/4	4/4		4/4						4/4	3/4	4/4	3/3				1/2				3/3
1982			3/4	2/3		2/4						4/4	2/4	4/4	2/3				2/2				2/3
1983			1/4	3/4		4/4						3/4	4/4	3/4	2/3				2/2				3/4
1984			3/4	4/4		4/4						3/4	4/4	1/4	3/3				2/2				2/3
1985			3/4	3/4		4/4						3/4	4/4	2/4	1/3				2/2				3/3
1986			3/4	4/4								3/4	4/4	1/4	1/3		1/4		2/2				2/3
1987			3/4	4/4							3/4	4/4	4/4		1/3		4/4		3/3				3/4
1988			3/4	3/4							5/5	4/4	2/4		3/3		2/4		2/2				1/3
1989			3/4	2/4							4/4	2/4	4/4		2/3		2/4		1/2				4/4
1990			2/4								4/4	1/4	1/4		2/3		4/4	3/4	2/3				2/3
1991			4/4								3/4		2/4		2/3		3/4	2/3	2/3		5/5		2/3
1992			4/4								3/4		3/4		2/3		3/4	2/4	2/3		2/4		2/4
1993			3/4						4/4		4/4		4/4		1/3		4/4	4/4	2/4		4/4		
1994					4/4				4/4		1/4		3/4		1/3		3/4	4/4	2/3		2/4		
1995					3/4				2/5		3/4		3/4		2/4		3/5	4/4	2/3		3/5		
1996					4/4				4/4		2/5		2/4		2/3		4/4	4/4	3/3		4/4		
1997					3/4				4/4		3/4		3/5		3/4		2/4	4/4	3/3		3/4		
1998					2/4				2/4		2/5		3/4		0/3		2/5	4/5	3/4		4/4		
1999					3/4				3/5		3/4		2/4		2/3		3/4	2/4	3/3		4/4		
2000					4/4				3/4		4/4		3/4		2/3		2/4	3/5	3/3		3/5		
2001					3/4				3/4		4/4		3/4		1/3		2/4	3/4	3/3		4/4		
2002					2/4				3/4		4/4		3/4		3/3		4/4	4/4	2/4		2/4		
2003					3/4				4/4		3/4		3/4		2/3		2/4	4/4	2/4		3/4		
2004					3/4				3/4		2/4		3/4		3/3		3/4	3/5	2/4		3/4		
2005	1/2				1/4				3/4		2/4		3/4			1/3	5/7	1/4	4/4		3/3		
2006	4/4				3/4				4/4		2/4					2/4	3/4	3/4	3/4		3/4		
2007	1/4				1/4				3/4		4/4					2/4	3/4	3/4	1/4		3/4		
2008	3/4				2/4				3/4		2/4					3/4	1/4	3/4	0/4		3/4		
2009	1/4				2/4				2/4		3/4					3/4	4/4		2/4		3/4		

A2.2 Justice Voting

Table A2 Descriptive Statistics of Justice Voting and Clerks

	Justice Voting			*Clerks*		
Justice	Terms	Votes Cast	Conservative Votes (%)	Number Hired	Proportion Observed (%)	Mean Ideology
Alito, Samuel	4	425	60.9	18	55.0	0.83
Black, Hugo L	10	1970	30.6	19	77.3	-0.30
Blackmun, Harry A	23	4278	46.2	88	71.9	-0.81
Brennan, William J	29	5389	27.4	91	79.6	-0.78
Breyer, Stephen	15	1539	42.5	64	67.2	-1.16
Burger, Warren E	16	3225	62.9	67	76.3	-0.29
Clark, Tom C	6	1201	40.4	13	85.7	-0.46
Douglas, William O	15	2578	18.5	26	87.8	-0.72
Ginsburg, Ruth Bader	16	1667	39.8	70	77.9	-1.09
Harlan, John M	10	1970	54.0	25	86.4	-0.74
Kennedy, Anthony	22	2552	57.3	95	74.1	0.15
Marshall, Thurgood	23	4304	25.4	82	79.3	-0.89
O'Connor, Sandra Day	24	3305	59.3	101	74.4	-0.63
Powell, Lewis F	14	2874	55.3	58	66.1	-0.55
Rehnquist, William	32	4892	67.9	98	67.4	0.11
Roberts, John	4	452	60.6	19	56.7	0.11
Scalia, Antonin	23	2759	64.9	101	68.6	0.27
Souter, David	18	1981	42.1	78	76.8	-1.09
Stevens, John Paul	34	4762	37.8	100	79.4	-0.96
Stewart, Potter	17	3409	47.3	48	85.6	-0.67
Thomas, Clarence	18	1938	67.6	78	78.7	0.79
Warren, Earl	8	1452	23.8	23	70.8	-0.41
White, Byron R	31	5728	48.6	90	78.4	-0.59

Figure A2 Distribution of Clerk CFscores By Justice




Figure A3 Scatterplot of Underlying Clerk Ideology by Justice Over Time






Figure A4 Relationship Between Justice-Term Level Mean Clerk CFscore and Percent Conservative Votes

A. Scatterplot



B. Binned-Scatterplot



A2.4 Alternative Ideology Statistics

Table A2.4: Influence of Clerk Ideology on Justice Votes Using Alternative Statistics

	Conservative Vote		*Δ Conservative Votes*	
	(1)	(2)	(3)	(4)
A. Median Justice-Year Clerk CFscore				
Clerk Ideology	0.014**	0.010		
	(0.006)	(0.009)		
Δ Clerk Ideology			0.007	0.008*
			(0.004)	(0.004)
R^2	0.129	0.134	0.509	0.513
B. Minimum Justice-Year Clerk CFscore				
Clerk Ideology	0.014***	0.013		
	(0.005)	(0.008)		
Δ Clerk Ideology			0.012***	0.013***
			(0.004)	(0.004)
R^2	0.129	0.134	0.520	0.526
C. Maximum Justice-Year Clerk CFscore				
Clerk Ideology	0.011**	0.005		
	(0.005)	(0.004)		
Δ Clerk Ideology			0.001	0.002
			(0.002)	(0.002)
R^2	0.129	0.134	0.503	0.508
Covariates				
Term FE	Yes	Yes	Yes	Yes
Justice FE	Yes	Yes	No	Yes
Justice Time Trends	No	Yes	No	No
N	66,209	66,209	404	404
Mean Conservative Votes	0.458	0.458	0.468	0.468

Note: Standard errors in parentheses. * p<0.1, ** p<0.05, *** p<0.01. Columns (1) and (2): standard errors clustered by justice and case. Specifications include issue area fixed effects. Columns (3) and (4): standard errors clustered by justice. Panels A, B, and C respectively report results using the median, minimum, and maximum clerk ideology for the justice-term.

A2.5 Conservative Votes by Subgroups

Table A4 Mean Conservative Vote Share and Proportion of Cases by Subgroups

	Conservative Vote Share (%)	*Proportion of Cases (%)*
All Cases	46.8	100.0
A. Case Attributes Subgroups		
NYT Cases	42.0	14.8
Not NYT Cases	47.4	85.2
CQ Cases	40.1	6.5
Not CQ Cases	47.3	93.5
Unanimous Cases	43.4	40.1
Not Unanimous Cases	48.9	59.9
Close Cases	48.0	29.7
Not Close Cases	46.1	70.3
B. Issue Areas Subgroups		
Civil Rights	43.8	18.3
Criminal Procedure	50.2	22.5
Economic Activity	41.9	18.3
First Amendment	41.3	8.3
Judicial Power	60.2	13.6
Other	38.5	18.9
C. Justice Attributes Subgroups		
Clerks Draft Opinion	48.2	93.1
Clerks Not Draft Opinion	24.0	6.9
Cons. Ideology above Median	57.5	57.2
Cons. Ideology below Median	32.5	42.8

Note: Each row reports the conservative vote share for subgroups of data indicated in the first column, as well as the proportion of total cases for the subgroup. Panel A reports statistics for: (i) high profile case, proxied by whether a case is high profile by whether it appears on the front page of the *New York Times* (NYT) (Epstein and Segal, 2000), (ii) legally significant cases, proxied by whether a case is classified as "major" by *Congressional Quarterly* (CQ), (iii) unanimous and non-unanimous cases, and (iv) "close" cases, defined as cases where the outcome is decided by a vote of 5-4 or 6-3. Panel B reports statistics by issue area of cases. Panel C reports statistics: (i) by whether the justice has clerks write a first draft of opinions, and (ii) liberal justices, based on whether the justice's conservative vote share is above or below the sample median.

A2.6 Survey of Former Clerks

To verify that clerks are typically hired early in the prior term, we conducted a survey of former Supreme Court clerks. To do so, we randomly selected 10% of our sample of clerks. We then searched for the email addresses of the former clerks in this sample using the information in our dataset (e.g., their name, law school attended, justice they clerked for). Through this process, we identified the email addresses of 102 former clerks.

We then sent each of those clerks the email on the next page. In total, 66 former clerks responded to us. Of those, 4 respondents reported having no memory of when they were hired. The other 62 respondents provided information on when they were hired. Although some respondents provided a month they believed they were hired, roughly half of respondents provided a range of time. For example, respondents provided answers like: "in the fall of 1984"; "late 1999 or early 2000"; or "during the third year of law school, 1993-94".

Given the form of the responses, we took a conservative approach and established the earliest quarter the clerk reported to have been hired. For example, for most clerks who reported starting in July, we recored clerks hired in April to June of the year they started as one quarter prior to the start date; January to March as two quarters prior to the start date; October to December as three quarters prior to the start date; and any time earlier as four or more quarters prior to the start date. The distribution of responses are reported below in Figure A5.

Text of Email Used for Our Survey

Dear [Insert First Name],

I am [Redacted for Review], and I am currently conducting research on the Supreme Court. As part of that research, I am trying to understand when Supreme Court clerks were hired for their clerkship. It is my understanding that you are a former Supreme Court clerk. I was hoping you would be willing to answer two short questions for me:

1. What is the month and year that you were offered your Supreme Court clerkship?

2. What is the month and year that you started your Supreme Court clerkship?


If you do not remember, any information would be helpful (as well as simply knowing that you do not remember). Your answers will be kept confidential. I am simply trying to document the average amount of time Supreme Court clerks are hired before they started, and will not in any way reveal personalized information.

Thank you for your time and help,

[Redacted for Review]

This research has been approved by the [University Redacted] Institutional Review Board. If you have any questions about participating in this research, you can contact the [Relevant Institutional Review Board] at [Contact Information Redacted].

Figure A5 Time Between the Hiring and Start Dates for Supreme Court Law Clerks



A2.7 Stability of Clerk Ideology Over Time

Table A5 Clerk Ideology Before and After Clerking

	Clerk Ideology After Clerkship	
	(1)	(2)
Clerk Ideology Before Clerkship	0.970***	0.966***
	(0.039)	(0.041)
Judge Ideology		0.016
		(0.042)
Obs	158	158
R-squared	0.799	0.799
Dep Var Mean	-0.662	-0.662

Note: Standard errors in parentheses. * p<0.1, ** p<0.05, *** p<0.01. Sample includes clerks from all levels of Federal courts.

A2.8 Accounting for the Retired Justices' Clerks

Table A6 Influence of Clerk Ideology on Justice Voting with Retired Clerk Reassignment

	Conservative Vote		***Δ Conservative Votes***	
	(1)	(2)	(3)	(4)
Mean Clerk CFscore	0.017**	0.012***		
	(0.007)	(0.004)		
Δ Mean Clerk CFscore			0.009*	0.010**
			(0.005)	(0.004)
Covariates				
Term FE	Yes	Yes	Yes	Yes
Justice FE	Yes	Yes	No	Yes
Justice Time Trends	No	Yes	No	No
N	66,209	66,209	404	404
R^2	0.129	0.134	0.500	0.535
Mean Conservative Votes	0.458	0.458	0.468	0.468

Note: Standard errors in parentheses. * p<0.1, ** p<0.05, *** p<0.01. Columns (1) and (2): standard errors clustered by justice and case. Specifications include issue area fixed effects. Columns (3) and (4): standard errors clustered by justice.